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Chapter One 
Post-Industrial Society: An Overview 
I 
During the past twenty-five years or so, an emerging 
body of literature has been devoted to what are interpreted 
as being fundamental changes in the nature of the advanced 
industrial societies. In general, what is argued is that the 
structural characteristics which supposedly typified "indus­
trial*' society have undergone such radical transformation 
that conventicnal modes of description have been rendered ob­
solete. As Todd La Porte has remarked: "Something akin tc,> 
the transformation from an agrarian to an induetria.l society 
••• is said to be occurring within today's advanced industrial 
states. n1 What we are inexorably moving towa.rds is usually 
referred to as "post-industrial" society, although numerous 
other labels, such e.s "post-r:.odern", "technetronic" and "post­
capi talist"' have been eoployed to describe it. (more often . 
than not reflecting differences in emphasis rather than in 
substance)., 
In this section, my objective is to provide a general 
overview of the concept of a post-industrial society. I an 








account tl1e oftentimes extreme differences f."unons individual 
theories, in particular those which relate to the manner in 
which a specific characteristic of post-industrial society 
develops. However, 2.t this point it is necessary that one 
get a feeling for what is common to the literature as a whole ,. 
I hope to ultimately demonstrate that "post-industrialism" in 
fact appears as the .modern representative of a d is
.tinci. tra""."' 
dition of political thought. Specifically, I will argue_that 
theories of post-industrial society implicitly entail what I 
refer to i1s a. ''technocratic" conception of the bases of le­
gitimate political authority. But in order to do this one 
needs to have a.t least a general understanding of the nature 
of post-industrial society as envisioned by its theorists. 
Before proceeding, I should admit to the reader that my 
use of the term npost-industrialism" is somewhat arbitrary.  
A vast array of writers have at one time or another.commented 
upon the structural changes which have recently characterized 
modern industrial societies. Wha.t I take to be unique about 
the post-industrialists is their tendency to view_these 
changes in terms of a historical progression. Theorists of 
post-industria either proclaim that the advanced societies 
have already entered a nnew era 11 , or more or le::::s self-con­
sciously predict that such will be the case if present trends 
ccntinue. Writers such 2.s Daniel Bell, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
a.nd John Kenneth Galbraith obviously fall into this mold, and 
it is their &.nalyses to wrtich I will primarily be responding. 
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However, for purposes of convenience and illrn:.:tra.tion I will 
be largely drawing upon Daniel Bell's analysis in his book, 
The Coming of Po�,t-Industrial Society. I think t:lis is a 
helpful approach for two reasons. First, at least with re­
spect to the structural characteristics of post-industrial 
society, Bell's account is fairly representative cf much o:f 
the other literature; the o�her theorists draw upon much of 
the sa�e data to support very similsr conclusions. Seconly, 
Bell is much more conscious of the problems:�associated with 
historical prediction than are the other theorists, which�:.l.:., 
means that--his.apalysis,is_consideraply.more �quivocal. It 
often proves necessary to respond specificelly to Bell's 
analysis in order to generalize my claims.c Hopefully,this 
approach will not result in any severe injustices to the 
views of the other theorists. 
II 
As we have seen, theories of post-industrial society 
generally assert the.t modern industrial societies are evol­
ving beyond a peculiarly "industrialu stage of development; 
it is held that in some fundasentr.sl sense these societies 
are entering an entirely new historical epoch. However, the 
crucial historical variable for the post-industrialists is 
not the relations of producti6n, as Marx had Erflued. The 
structural ch_2racteristics of post-industria develop inde-
uendentl;y from productive relations; almost any type of re­






a npost-industrial" condition. The reason for this is that 
post-industrialism, as the label suggests, specifically re­
fers to a hither state of technical and eccno:G1ic development. 
Consequently, technolocical change alone is thought to account 
fer the salient characteristics of post-industrial society. 
To be sure, Harx himself saw the forces of production as pro­
viding the imnetus for historical change. But for Nar:x: the 
forces of production are historically significant only insofar 
as they lead to changes in the relations of production • .:For 
theorists of post-industrial society on the other hand, le­
vels o:f technological virtuosity and sophistication themselves 
determine historical "stages'*. This of course explains why 
the post-industrir:lists a.re so often associated with theories 
of social end political "convergence". 
In any case, :for the most pLrt what the post-industrial­
ists ,do is to indicate how technologic2l advance has :J_ed or 
will lei:2d to fundeJnental alterations in the cha,racteristic 
features of industrial society. Much of the discussion cen­
ters around ti1e political, social and ethical impli c&_t io.p.s_ 
of new exotic technologies such as computers, instEmt commu­
nications techniques, bio-medical developments 2nd the like. 
Considerable emphasis is plr,ced upon such technoloc:y-ina\wed 
phenomena as, for example, the heightened pace of social 
change, the- increasingly immediate, though impressionistic� 
nature of experience, and the privatization and de-humaniza­
tion th2t ere inevitably said to accompany all of this. 
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We are then told of the necessity to somehow manage or adapt 
to all of this. Alvin Toffler's Future Shock is perhaps the 
best ext-•mple of this type of analysis. 2 I would t-1rgue, how­
ever, that focusing upon the impact of specific technologies 
really serves to obscure what is actually central to most 
theories of post-industrial society, although this is deci­
dedly not the case with resp_ect to the imperative.for adap­
t a ti on and management which I will return to later. 
It seems to me that one can isolate two interdependent 
conceptions which in varying degrees characterize most the�­
ories of post-industrial society. First of all, it is com­
monly argued that the transition to post-industria marks the 
emergence of a new technical-manacerial elite which replaces 
the old capitalist plutocracy. Often ansociated with this 
is the assertion that meritocratic recruitment patterns will 
assume paramount importance in the post-industrie.l society. 
Both of these claims are based largely upon an analysis-of 
the impact of technological adVf'nce upon the occupational -
structure of the advanced industrial societiea, particularly 
the United States. It becomes abund2ntly clear upon examin­
ing the literature that the most fundemental impact doesn't 
lie in the razzle-dazzle of 11future shockn, or in the arrival 
of a Mc:c1u...½.anesque ,. global villiage 11, al thougp. the intrinsic 
significance of the�.e phenomena is not to be der:.ied. The-
most far-reaching effect of technological advance is much less 
exotic. It lies in the phenomenel increases in industrial 
' t· ·t '1.·ch n' �ve tEl�e� �,1L�ce ouer the last centurv. 3 proo. uc .� wn c.- ·� - .u .':' . • ,J --
I 
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In and of itself this is relr,.tively unimportant ,. since 
the post-industrj_c1clists a.re interested in isolating some .I".eally 
funde .. mental change, and increasing technological virtuosity 
per se ca.nnot be said to constitute such a change. However, 
technological :::�_dvance has resulted in profound changes in the 
relative distribution of workers within various sectors of the 
labor force, which are themselves said to be indicative of a 
change in the class structure of modern industrial societi�s. 
It is this phenomenon which really attracts the attention of 
the post-industrislists. 
Many theorists, including the post-industrialists, have 
found it convenient to divide modern economies into three 
--
s�s which, interestingly enough, 2re associated with the . .  '
perceived st2.ges of economic growth: The p�.ry, secondary 
and the so-called t1tertiary'• or service sector, *'comprising 
trade finance, insurance and ree.l e2tate: personal, profe�siona], 
business and repair services; and general government."4 What 
:-i.as happened is that increasing productivity in both the pri­
mary and secondary sectors (which are concerned, respecti�ely, 
with the provision of raw materials and manufacturing) has· 
freed a significant portion of the labor force formerly _asso­
ci2-ted with those sectors, thus facilitating its abr: rnrption 
into the tertiary sector. 
To say that these occupational trends have been well­
docUL.1ented is indeed an understatement. Bell in fact devotes 
two very tedious chapters to this. But the importance of 
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these developments likewise cannot be understood in isolation, 
since one cannot draw any obvt ous conclusions about the cla.ss 
structure of the sdvanced societies merely from the rise of 
the service sector. After all, a good many of these jobs-­
low-level clerks, typists, stenographers and the like--req_uire 
little or no specialized expertise, Fnd As such lend no sup­
port to the notion that this trend is somehow politically sig­
nificc.nt. What Bell and the others are really interested in 
is the equally rapid growth of scientific and technical per­
sonnel i;d thin the expanding whi te-co1ltr sector, since it is 
this group which is said to become dominant both socic.lly .snd 
politically in a post-industrial society. It is perhaps most 
accur&te to say, then, that the rise of the service sector is 
really te..ken to be symbolic of the emergence of new bases of 
class structuration. In any case, the important thing to 
realize at this point is that theories of post-industrial so­
ciety are� at bottom, <:�!:����al.Ys�. · 
The question of course now arises as to precisely how 
technological advance has brought about a redistribution of 
politicel power. So the theory goes, once a certain level. 
of economic growth has been reached, any further increases in 
productivity (_really in any types of efficiency) are ul ti::nate­
ly dependent upon the conscious and systematic Bpplication 
of codified "theoretical" knowledee. Oftentimes this refers 
speci:ficslly to modern oreenizational and decision-I!la-
king tecr.rnic;ues such as r.,ystems an2lysis, cost-benefit anoly­
sis, progrEill'l budgeting :0md operBtions research. Taken in its 
I 
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broadest sense, however, the notion ttat theoretical know­
ledge has become crucial for t!:e continued progress of the 
industricd societies refers to the increasing dependence:; of 
that progress upon ttpure» scientifi research. John Kenneth 
c�2lbr2.i th Eipells out the nature of this a ependence in his 
book, The New Industrial StHte.5 He points out that during 
the e2r1y stages of indus.trial development it was not unusual 
for the c2pitalist entrepeneur to effect significant advances 
in industrial and orgarizational technique simply by employ­
ing his own creative imagination. This is no longer possible. 
Eecause of the staggering technical complexity of even the 
r::or:t rudime:nt2ry industrial undertakings, they must be subdi­
vided into taeks which are amen�ble to the applicatiqn of 
-orc:ctiC<'Jl ncientific knowlecge. Building a supersonic air­
plane, to cite Gr-:1lbrai th' s example, required the development 
of metals which met seemingly incompatible specifications of' 
weight and durability. But this of course me&ns that the suc­
cess of the overall task was 2t lea.st in part dependen� _upon 
the activities of the rese�rch chemist. Thus, although Gal­
braith doesn't use the term "theoretical" knowledge, he very 
definitely sees the activiti�s-of the corporation as being 
ultimately dependent upon esoteric scientific techniques ., 
far as I can tell, the only reason Bell uses the term 
"theoretical" as onnosed to "scientific" is that he a oes · not .... l.. 
� 0.mt to appear to be limiting himself to the natural and 
physic2l sciences. In any case, the significance of all of 
t�is is the same for both theorists. 
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What happens is th&t the rising importance of abstract 
technical and scientific knowhow is inevitably accompanied 
by the rising importance of those who possess it. Technolo­
gical_ advance renders the experts or "technocrats" _functio�­
ally indispensable, anci as a result they become the dominant 
group not only politically, but socially as well. Bell tells 
u.s that ••• 
••• the making of decisions, because of the intri-
cately linked nature of their consequences, will 
have an increasingly technical character. The 
husbanding of talent and the spread of intellectu­
al institutions will become a prime concern of 
the society; not only the best talents but the en­
tire complex of prestige and status will be roo�ed · 
in the intellectual and scientific communities. 
The crucial point to realize here is the.t theorists of P?�t­
industriEl society generally share the view that as a._result 
of the multiplying complexities of social and economic or-
ganization, a.11 forms of decision-making become increasingly 
dependent upon specialized scientific or tecr1.nical expertise. ---
Consequently, this burgeoning class of highly trained experts 
eventually supplants the industrialists, business leaders,­
and particularly the politicians as the group primarily re---
sponsible for making important policy decisibns at all levels. 
As I see it, this is probably the most import2.nt characteris­
tic of theories of post-industrial society1 In all cases, 
the fact that technical knowledge has itself become an indis-
pensahle co:11modi ty r::1ec.ns thnt the value of traditional sour­
ces of political power declines substantially. Galbraith 
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describes how the reliance upon specialized expertise works 
to effectively neutralize the role of owne�ship within the 
corporation. What Bell does is to evaluate the consequences 
of this phenomenon for society as a ,,,.,.hole. No longer is po­
litical power a function of ownership of the means of nro­
duction. "Class", as Bell remarks, "denotes not a specific 
group of persons, but a syst'em the.t has institutionalized the 
ground rules for acquiring, holcing and transferring differ­
ential power and its attendant privi@es. "7 In a post­
industrie.l society, these ground rules ere technical skill 
as the basis of power and position, with education as the ne­
cessary route of access to s-kill. This explains why Bell is 
able to argue that "the university becomes the 2rbiter of 
class position" in post-industri&l society. 
As was mentioned earlier, very clo$ely related to the 
"new class" thesis is the notion that post-industrial soci­
ety becomes increasingly chcracterized by meritocratic re­
cruitment patterns. If indeed technological advance, and the 
organizational and socisl complexity associated with it, 
bring:· about a reliance upon specialized technical expertise, 
then it becomes incumbent upon the advanced societies to in­
sure that "the best and the brightef't11 are located in elite 
positions. We have seen that "progress/fin a post-industrial 
society (defined in terms of measureable increases in any 
types cf efficiency, output, production, etc.) is ultimately 
dependent uuon i=:dva.nces witbin highly specialized and esoteric 
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realms of inquiry. Again, this refers not me:r·ely to the na­
tural and behavioral sciences, but also to the sociHl scien­
ces and cuch modern organizational and administrative tech� 
niques as systems analysis and operations research • .At any 
rate, to the extent that these techniques have become ration­
alized and codified, it becomes possible to determine what 
specific talents and abilities are necessary to master them. 
This being the case, it only makes sense to actively seek 
out those persons who possess the objective "qualifications" 
as measured by some sort of standardized test, s_nd to esca-
late them into functional positions commensurate with their 
abilites. Zbigniew Brzezinski states the case quite baldly • 
••• the key to successful adaptation to new condi-
tions is in the effective selection, distribu-
tion end utilization of social t9lent. If indus­
trial society is said to have developed through a 
struggle for the survival of the fittest, the 
technetronic society--in order to prosper--requires 
the effective mobilization of the ablest. Objec-
tive and systematic criteria for the selection of 
those with the greatest gifts will have to be de­
veloped, and the maximun opportunity for their 
training and advancement provided. a 
In like m�nner, Bell asserts that the post-ind us trifJ 1 soci­
ety is "in its initial logic,. a meritocracy, because other­
;dse it could not fulfill the requirements of the new social 
division of labor which characterizes it. 
By nov it probably goes without saying that theories of 
post-industrial society very much represent a critique of 
the r.i:ar.::dsn conceptior, of historical development, particularly 
with respect to its ar;sumptions about class structuration in 
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the advanced industrial societies. But in devel�ping such a 
critique, the post-industrialists are ultimately led to form­
ulate an e _lternative conception. This has far-reaching con­
r:eq_uences for the way in vhich post-industrialism should be 
interpreted, as we will soon discover. 
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· Chapter . Two 
Post-Industrialism as Normative Technocracy 
I 
What I have tried to do up to now is perhaps best c�­
acterized as the formulation of an "ideal-typical" post-:I:-ndus­
trial society through the selective isolation of what J take 
to be its essential characteristics. Consequently, the model 
I have outlined here could be used as a standard by which one 
could roughly judge the degree to which modern industrial so­
cieties approach or depart from a post-industrial condition. 
This is indeed an important Question, and it is one to which 
I will return later in this essay. In this section, however, 
I am primarily concerned with demonstrating that theories of 
post-industrial society in fact represent more than the '':val..:. 
ue neutral" inquiries of disinterested social scientists. 
Specifically, it seems to me that the post-industrialists 
are very much interested in defending the technocratic elitism 
which, as we have seen, is central to their theories. This 
is not to say that they are advocates of some kind of tech­
nocra.tic dictatorship. Far from it. But I would argue that 
they see the hegemony of a scientific-technical elite as the 
only rational adaptation to technological advance, and that 
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they express no significant regrets concerning the diminish� 
ing role of politics which mus� i_nevi_tably accompany such a 
ch2nge. 
A charge of this nature is extremely difficult to pr.ove, 
especially given the fact that some of the post-industrial­
ists--this is particularly true of Bell--go out of their way 
to deny that the salient characteristics of post-industria 
are in any sense »inevitable", let alone necessarily de�ire­
able. The post-industrialists are extremely conscious of the 
fact that their methods and categories of analysis very .c!�se­
ly resemble those which characterize much ninteenth-century 
social theory, particularly Harxism. They want to avoid 
seeming to engage in any type of long-term historical �redic­
tion based upon the isolation of one_ social .variable, which 
ie. deemed to be in some sense 0 central0 , and hence capable 
of accounting for all other social phenomena. This sentiment 
is echoed by Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: 
I am dealing here with tendencies, and have sought 
to explore the meaning and consequences of those 
tendencies if the changes in social structure that 
I describe were to work themselves to their logical 
limits. But there is no guarantee that they will. 
Social tensions and social conflicts may modify a 
society considerably; wars and recriminations can· 
destroy it; the tendencies mRy provoke a set of re-
actions which inhibit change. Thus I am writing 
an "as if" fiction, a logical construction of what 
could be ••• 
Use of the prefix "post0 thus reflects what I think amounts 
to a basic 2.mbivalence on the part of these theorists. It 







historical epoch, but also the realization that one cannot 
define with any precision just what the next 0stagen really 
is. bec2.use to do so would imply that we have no choice but 
to adapt '·to its 0objective 11 requirements. The post-industri­
c.lists try desperately to avoid seeming to fall into this 
predicament. When such an attempt is made , as is the case 
largely with Bell, one is c onfronted with an almost incom­
prehensible morass of contradictions. But when it is not 
made , the technocratic bias implicit in most theories of 
post-industrial society is exposed for all to see. 
- II 
One is undoubtedly well-aware of the fact that techno­
cratic elitism--the notion that truly legitimate political 
authority derives from the possession of scientific or tech­
nical knowledge--is not an exclusively modern idea, and cer­
tainly is not by any means unique to theories of post-indus­
trial society . Indeed, to the extent that these theories do 
in fact entail such a conception, they belong to a distinct 
tradition of political thought in this respect. Therefore , 
what I would like to do at this point is give a detailed ac­
count of the general nature, purposes and implications of 
explicitly technocratic theories, drawing upon Francis Bacon, 
Henri de Saint-Simon and Thorstein Veblen. We will then be 
in a much better position to determine the degree to which 
contemporary theories of post-industrial society involve 
technocrD ..tic le[;i timstions. 
It is reveaJ ing to note that much of what has been 
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referred to as 11 classical 11 technocracy is distinctly utopian, 
if it is not actually presented in the form of a utopia . The 
first modern vision of a technocratic order, Francis Bacon ' s  
Mew Atlantis , is perhaps the best example of this . 2 ' This 
very tentative and inconclusive work describes the visit of · 
a crew of English na1lors to the hitherto uncharted island­
kingdom of Bensalem. What they find is a society which is 
organized around the imperative for scientific research arid 
technological application as described in Novum Or,ganum. · .: · ·  
"The End of Our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, the 
secret motions of things ; and the enlarging of the botinds�:6f 
the Human Empire, to the effecting of all things pos sible. u 3: 
For this purpose, stations for scientific research and tech­
nological implementation have been set up thrOUGhout the·· king­
d om . Each one is mo,nned by highly trained specialists , 2n� 
is devoted to the analysis of any p0 ,3 fdble aspect of mdure" 
which might eventualJ.y yield practical results . The king-
, dom was founded hundreds of yer'l.rs ee.rlier by a man , King $0-
lc..mona , 0 l·:ho crwas wholly bent to make his kingdom end people 
happy; ,  The fruits of his system are manifest in "a  vast 
kno.wledge of the earth, air , water, animals , fish and vege- · 
tat ion along 1;,i th the use:f'ul development of great r:iach:i.nes, 
i'oods, and marvelous devices of every description . " 4  
The significance of Bac on 's  utopia, as with all techn o­
cratic writings, lies in the nature cf the relationship be­









the Eew .Atlantis the poli tica.l sphere, which seems to involve 
nothing more than routine administration and -, curiously 
enough, religious ritual , is clearly subordinate . Salomon 's  
House, the elaborate scientific academy j ust mentioned , and 
its ruling elite clearly have been given free rein to govern 
in Bensalem. Governing is based exclusively upon the know­
ledge and performance of the scientists and technicians .  
However, Langdon Winner has .pointed out that precisely how 
we are to interpret this situation is by no means obvious ; 5� 
the New Atlantis might either be a positive or a negative 
utopia. For example, Bacon does not make it clear exactly 
whz the people of Bensalem should be happy with their lot, 
apart from the fact that they are well provided for . Also, 
the aura of secrecy a.nd mystery which surrounds the island , 
and the vague references made to political corruption ra�se 
some questions as to how we are supposed to view Bensalem . 
Nevertheless, the N'ew Atlantis does exhibit characteristic­
ally tecl1nocratic conceptions of political power and author-
,_. .. �.�--·-
ity, even though doubts might persist as to Bacon ' s  inten­
tions . 
First o:f all, political p m·:er is no longer based upon 
such things as wealth , personal charisma , social status and 
the like . In an age in which the technological possibi li-
ties of s cientific knowledge a.re within reach , and hence · __ _ 
where the people who understG.nd and control the technoloc:ies 
becor.:ie :.ncr·easingly indispensable to the functioning of 
-1 8--
society, these sources of political power become mere anach-
ronisms. In te chnocratic writings such overtly "poli tical'.t 
( 
factors, to the extent that they still function, are vie-d 
ttcrs upon the inexorable and ultimately benign devel-
opment of science and technological syst�ms. Political )'JO!-
e r, as Winner has remarked, "is ultimately the power (?f na-:-
ture itself. " 6 Power accrues to those who, through the a1;>-
plication of the scientific method, or through the manipula­
tion of the technologies which it produces, are able to cre­
ate tangible be@its for mankind. Since traditional sources 
cf political power are unable to do this, they must ineyitably 
be swept away in the wake of the sheer  potency: of technolo­
gical systems. Such a conception of course aiso rests true 
political authority, as opposed to political power, upon en-
- ' 
tirely new bases. Authority is no longer based upon a pri.or 
commitment to some metaphysical doctrine , or upon some in.:.. ' 
, l- . •4' 
tangible personal che,racteristic. Rather ,  authority is 
based squarely upon one's ability to produce visible results . 
This is a distinctly Baconian notion, insofar as what 
. ' ,-
is ul timat.ely being asserted is the authority of the sciE:1+­
tific method. Traditional sources of authority are inade� 
q_uate because they simply haven't worked for the betterment 
of mankind . Their hegemony has led to nothing but endless 
2r:d inherently unresolvable bickering. It is not really 
possible here to enga.ge in a lengthy discourse on Bacon's 
conception of the s cientific method. What is important to 
l 
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notice at this point, however, is that Bacon felt that sci­
ence as an activity was j ustified only insofar as it led to 
t he development of techniques which objectively {i  •. e .  mater­
ially) benefit society. To be sure, Bacon held that the sci­
entific method s.llows one to discover a ttreali tytt which ex­
ists independently from the observer. But the structure of 
reality itself, to the extent that the scientific method fa­
cilit2tes its possible reconstruction, gives one a theoreti­
cally limitless power to act in the world . Bacon does not 
hesitate to admit that it is this characteristic which really 
legitimates the a.uthority of the scientific method , of course 
at the expense of more traditicnal forms of authority. Tech­
nocratic theories 2.lmost invariably rest upon these Baconian 
premises. 
Political authority, then, is really a function of tech­
nical virtuosity, which is itself dependent upon the accumu­
lation of scientific knowledge . Notice , however , that since 
science is justified by its unique capacity to produce re­
sults, .£..2.!h the so-called "pureu scientists and the techni­
cians will be legitimated as rulers in technocratic theories .. 
In any c2,se , the universal prereq_uisi te for acquiring poli­
tical -power and au thority is functional indisnensabilit;y. 
And according to the technocratic principle of legitimacy 
just described, it ·would make very little sense to make en 
artificial distinction between scientists and technicians 
with respect to their relative indispensability. Bacon him­
self d e scribes a division of labor within Salomon ' s  House 
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between those who engage in bt!.Sic resee.rch a.nd those who d e­
cide h ow the results of this research can or should be put 
to use. 
It is als o  important to reaJ.ize that technocratic the­
ories always assume the persistence of social ::::.nd political 
inequality. The fact that political authority is based upon 
the acceptance of a method {as opposed to some metaphysical 
doctrine or world-view) does not lead to broader bases of ' 
political enfrs.nchisement . Indeed, as Winner has shown, __,_... . .  
technocratic theories form a su�ory of_��e the orf. : 1 
The difference between technocratic elites and other ty;;� 
of elites whose rule is legitimated by some ttpoliti cal •t . 
• -4 ":. 
principle (e. g . , re.ligion, natural law, contract, etc.) 'is · ·  
of course that techI1ocratic elites really do "know" some­
t�ing. The essential distinction between elite and mass 
nonetheless remains. As one might expect, the notion that 
populer participation of any kind should play a significc.nt 
role in governing is conspicuously ab8ent from tecfhocr2 tic 
theories .. To the extent that a society is d .enendent unon ... � 
the cper2tion of complex technological systems, it is clear 
that the knowledge held by tlle f,verage citizen or even by 
his elected representatives is really unnecessary to �eep 
t::-:e system running .  Even in ostern,i bly democ:rr0 tic ree::itY1es, 
the poli tici ;:en bec or:1es function2.lly irrelev.s.nt . l v quite · ela-
borate p olitic,,l " supers tructure tt might still exist , as in 
Bens2.lem1 but in all cases the underlying technocrrdic  
· fl f oundation" will be obvious.  
This leads one to ask whether technocratic theorists are 
interes ted in really legitimizing ru-le by 8}..1)ert � or whether 
they we.nt to demonstrate that it is simply a hi£torical fact. 
In a certain sense , this is largely an irrelevant distinc­
tion. I t  is precisely because theorists of technocracy see 
scientists and technicians as really being in control that 
they further maintain that this is a politically d es�)ble 
Lr"' 
state of affairs. The technicians , do not acquire power 
through subterfuge , bribery or political infighting. Neither 
is personal influence , age , ideology or any other such char­
acteristic of any use to them. The technocratic theorist ar­
gues t hat if technical elites have effective power in the so­
ciety, then it must be because their talents are peculiarly 
relevant to politics . Even more to the point, these theo­
rists see technical rationality or science as the antithesis 
of politics as such. Ofte��� a contra st is made between 
� .. .. <�•"·" ·-"'� 
the "corru.pt tt or "ur1chaste" realm of politics , and the sub­
lime purity of science. On the one hand , one finds the self­
intere� or vainly ideological politic i an ;  and on the other 
the v,�.)i-:U�s technician. The technocratic theorist does not 
have to "prove" that politics ought to be the exclusive do­
main of scientific and technical elites. Al l that is neces­
s2-ry is to show that the political realm is itself inherent­
ly corrupt , inefficient, 2nd most importantly , irrelevsn t .  
Recent political history ought to tell us that this is by no 
means t he m or, t dif'fic:.t l t enterprise. Indeed , one need only 
observe the fruitless  disnutations among self-serving '. 
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ideologues for confirmc�tion. The "authority" of technocratic 
elites, then , i s  "proven" t o  a large extent b;i' negstive ex­
ample . How can the p olitician, priest or philosopher be said 
t o  have ro1thority if in fact their truly useful actions u.l­
ti�ately depend up on the real knowledge of the expert ?  The 
technocratic response is, needless t o  say, that they cann�t . 
nPoli tica.l" {i. e. ,  non-scientific) e.uthori ty is an illusion 
from the start. 
The invidious comparison of science and p olitics is no­
where more apparent than in the writings of two of the most 
recent theorists of technocracy, Henri de Saint-Simon arJ 
Thorstein Veblen. Saint-Simon 's  work represents a response 
t o  the most severe political upheaval �the modern era, the 
French Revolution. For Saint-Simon , the political disorder 
that it engendered created a grand opportunity for the whole­
sale restructuring of French s ociety. And the principles 
upon which this c ould be based were t o  be found in science 
and industry. a Saint-Simon felt that these forces contained 
within them a "logic" which ought to  govern _social arrange.:... 
ments. This l ogic involved a distinctly technocratic concep­
tion of political p ower and authority. Society as it was 
then organized was nupside down°, according to  Saint-Simon. 
Why? Because the classes which were least responsible for 
the mainterwnce of the industrial civilization which was 
emerging out of the Revoluti on in fact governed. Here again 
·we encounter the urincinle of function as the new societal 
legitimation. Ssint-Simon maintained th.at an ent irely new 
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s ocial l-:fei7archy was rec1uired, based upon relative contri.bu� 
""· ···· 
tion. Those persons directly involved with the essential 
scientific, economic and industrial processes around i·rhich 
s ociety is to be organized will naturally govern. For Saint­
Simon, these were the scientists, engineers, industrialists 
and, curiously enough, the artists .  
Saint-Simon's critique of the French Revolution , there­
fore , was based upon his perception that the various .factions 
involved were concerned only with advancing their petty ide­
ologies ; their motives were excessively political : ·g, He .felt 
that his scheme wa.s legitimate bacause it was the only one 
capable of overc0t�ling the conflict that is inherently asso­
ciated with politics. Saint-Simon did not feel himself .im-
pelled to " justify" , for example, the technocratic elitisfu, 
lack of participation and mainifest inequality which he .free­
ly admitted were lcgical requirements of his system .  After 
all, the masses would be perfectly willing to accept these 
features if they exist ,  as part of a system which is capable 
of achieving unprecedented material abundance .. All types 
of conflict will be overcome in a society organized around 
its truly eti sential purpose--the ration2.l exJoitation of na­
ture in accordance with scientific principles . I t  is be­
c2.use the conflict of p olitical end s is s een as preventing 
this goal from being realized that a radical distinction be­
tween politics and the loe;ic of scientific organization is 
made .  Indeed , in technocratic theories generally . " politics" 
is in eff'ect defined a:..� that which prevents the ordering of 
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s ociety according to the ste.ndc.rds of technical rationality. 
It simply never occurs to these theorists that their schemes 
require independent legitimation , since they will inevitably 
prove themselves if only the shackles of politics can be re-
-­
moved. 
Of course , what is to be included under the rubric "pol­
itics" varies among individual theorists . The ideas of Thor­
stein Veblen illustrate this point very clearly. Saint-Simon 
was so profoundly impressed by the sheer power and organiza­
tional capacity of the industrial techniques emerging in his 
day, that it just didn ' t  seem possible that the individuals 
responsible for all of this were following anything other 
the,n the "objective" laws of technical rationality. The cap­
italist entrepeneurs were to be included in Saint-Simon's 
governing elite because from his perspective, the private in­
terests of the entrepeneur neatly coincided with the general 
interest of the entire community. (which by definition entails 
the extension of technical rationality to society as a whole) . 
Veblen, however, was well-aware that this is not always the 
case. While the entrepeneur was instrumental in developing 
the industrial system, he no longer performs any truly essen­
tial function with respect to it. Rather, it is the quiet 
en5ineer who is now indispensable for the day to day opera­
tion of the system. 1 0 But for Veblen it is not merely that 
the "c&.ptains of industry" perform no function logically re­
quired by the system ,  since their continued presence actually 
interferes \,ith its efficient ( t . e .  non�political) operation. 
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T o  the extent that the capitalist entr&neur is motivated 
by his greed , at the expense of a commitment to technical ra­
tiontlity, his efforts can only serve to reduce output and 
efficiency. Veblen went so far as to label· the - activi:ty of 
the business aristocracy "sabotage ", although this was osten­
sibly a value-neutral term .  Their essentially political mo­
tives prevent the realization of goals which are really in­
trinsic to the industrial system itself. 
But although Veblen was interested in . ridding the indus­
trial system of those persons which Saint-Simon felt were 
most essentia.l to it, this really represents nothing more 
than a house-cl eaning. Veben ' s  quarrel with Saint-Simon 
really serves to illuminate their fundamental agreement. 
For both Veblen and Saint-Simon, npolitics" is that which ob­
scures what would otherwise be self-evident principles ,of so­
cial organization; politics is universally viewed as the an­
tithesis of the community interest, which as we have seen is 
defined as the rational ordering of society according to 
scientific principles. We are now in a better position, to  
understand why ttfunctional indispensability" is simply taken 
for granted as the real basis of legitimate politic al f!.uthor­
ity in technocratic theories .  Those who are most responsi­
ble for the maintenance and devE;lopment of the syste.n are by 
definition the least susceptible to political motivations. 
The principle of function, then , i§. in a sense an n ethical11 
legi tima.tion of political 2.u thori ty . Technocratic theorists 
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would und oubtedly never admit to having such a view , but the 
very logic of their position occasionally brings it t o  the 
surface in their writings. Veblen 's  remarks are a case in 
point: 
In this two-cleft, or bi-cameral, administration of 
industry, the technicians may be said to  represent 
the community at large in its industrial capacity, 
or in other words the industrial system as a going 
concern ; whereas the business men speak for· the com­
mercial interest of the absentee owners, as a b od.y
1 which holds the industrial community in usu:fruct . 1 . 
This image of the technicians as somehow collectively .r�s_pon­
sible for the public welfare I think partly explains why · 
technocratic theorists have often employed the m�taphor of 
the priesthood when attempting to describe the special au­
thority of these people. 
III 
The question which now beckons us is whether or not it 
is p ossible to  determine a sense in which contemporary theo­
ries of post-industrial society can be said t o  entail a ��ch­
nocr�tic conception of political le�im�?Y and_"'a�thor�. 
Based upon what has been said in the previous sections , the 
answer would seem to be a.n emphatic yes . As we have seen, 
the post-industrialists argue that as a result of technolo-:­
gical advance , all forms of decision-making become increas­
ingly dependent upon speciHlized "theoretical" knowlede;e .  
In fact, decision-making processes themselves have become pro­
gressively ra.tionalized, and to this extent now often involve 
the manipulation of arcane mathematical symbol- systems and 
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techniques. We have also noted the rise to political promi­
nence of a class of highly educated scientists, technicians 
and mana,sers as a result of all of this. Post-industrial so­
ciety, then, does indeed exhibit several characteristically 
"technocratic" structural features .  One is confronted with 
an image of a society organized in accordance with the re­
quirements of technical rationality, and in which legitimate 
political authority is largely monopolized by the expert. 
But this does not provide us with sufficient grounds f,or 
asserting that post-industrialism actually represents an up­
dated version of technocratic political theory. Technocracy , 
as I understand it, is fundamentally a. n attempt to establish 
entirely new bases of political legitimacy. In other wbrds , 
technocratic theorists are interested in demonf:.,trating that 
experts somehow ought to ·govern. It is by no means obvious 
V y 
that theorists of post-industrial society make such a claim.  
Bel.l. , who is perhaps the most cautious of the post-industrial 
theorists, makes a point of stressing that he is not in any 
way attempting to ttlegitimate" the rule of technocrats • . He 
frequently asserts that "political" conflicts will not be 
eliminated as a result of the increasingly technical nature 
of decision-making. Bell takes what is an essentially Weber­
ian position, in that he argues that while scientific expert.:.. 
ise ca.n 11 inf ormu political · a,ction, it alCone cannot stand as 
the basis for choosing between funda.rnen-tally incompatible 
value positions. In mainta.ining such a view, Bell must con-
clude that scientists and technicians possess no uniquely 
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politic2l �uthority. However, I will argue that the logic 
of Bell ' s  argument leads to precisely the opposite conclu­
sion. To see why this is the case, we must examine the - na­
ture of his position more closely. 
IV 
We have seen that theorists of post-industrial society 
are very concerned with at least seeming to avoid making 
any type of long-term historical predictions. They want to 
make a clear distinction between the ir own brand of theoriz� 
ing and the predominately historicist social theories of the 
ninteenth century. There are a couple of very good reasons 
for doing this, the first of course being the fact that any 
attempt to "predict" the course of history is by its very na­
ture exceedingly tenuous, and involves considerable risk and 
uncertainty. It goes without saying that the empirical 
shortcomings of l'"Iarxist history, particularly with respect 
to its assessment of class structuration in the advanced so­
cieties and the revolutionary potential of the proletariat , 
stand as a constant reminder of this for the post-industrial-
-----� 
ists. Hore important, however, is the fact that social theo-
rizing in which historical prediction plays a dominant role 
usually has profound normative implications. Although his­
toricist theories are not c oncerned with advancing some abso­
lute meta3=.1hysical doctrine or world-view, the real signifi­
Q_a:o.ce of comprehending historical ttlaws" is that such an un­
c.erstand ing usually serves D s  the basis for a critique of 
the status quo. If  one accepts that the development of a 
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p articular arrangement of social institutions is in any sense 
inevitable, then by definition truly rational action can only 
be that which is adaptive wi th respect to the predicted devel­
opment. Therefore, to the extent that the post-industria_l.:. 
ists can be said to advance an historicist argument, the "val­
ue-neutrality0 of that argument is at least seriously called 
into question. I will argue that the concept of post-indus­
trial society does indeed rest upon fundamentally historicist 
methodological assumptions. 
ttHistoricism",  as Karl Popper has maintained, is "an ap­
proach to the social sciences which assumes that prediction 
is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is at­
tainable by disco vering the ' laws • or 'trends ' that underlie 
the evolution of history. " :1 2 But the very possibility of ar­
riving at such laws d epends upon further assumptions about 
the nature of social organization a.nd social development � 
First of all, it must be held that the various aspects of so­
cial life are interrelated to such a degree that we may legit­
i!nately refer to a social �ystem. Secondly, one must assume 
that within that system there exists an activity which is 
so,:nehow "fundamental", in that it is a precondition of the 
other aspects of the system and that it is immune from t heir 
influence. This activity is in a sense the "ganglion" or 
nerve center of the system, and it is held to be the central 
source of change . All chnnges in rrderivative" social activi­
t ies c2.n thus never be assessed independently from what is 
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regarded as n fundamentaln . Consequently , forecasting chan­
ges in this central activity allows one to predict the nature 
of the future social order more generally. 
These assumptions are of course at the bottom of Marx ' s  
distinction between the "foundation" and the "superstructure" .  
But very similar assumptions also underlie the concept of 
post-industrial society. As ·we noted in an earlier . section, 
theories of post-industrial society are essentially class 
analyses . To a large extent the post-industrialists are _ in­
terested in demonstrating why Marx 's  predictions concer,ning 
the nature of class structuration in the advanced societies 
have not been confirmed. In other words, the concept of post­
industrial socie ty (2,nd for that matter Clark Kerr ' s  notion o:f 
uindustrial" society) ,1 :'.3 is used as the basis for a cri tigue 
of the Marxian c onception of unilinear historical develop­
ment . But in order to do this, the post-industrielists are 
led to formulate a. rival conception, only in this case what 
is regarded as "fundamental" is not the relations of produc­
tion, but technical and economic development. Bell as much 
as admits this when he remarks that his purpose is " to re-­
s tore some of the informing :power of older modes of social 
,t4 !,  analysis . '' '  
That this is in fact the case is given further support 
by the post-indtu}trialists' almost unilaterril endorsement 
of the so-called 11 �onvergence 11 thesi§ . Basically what is in­
volved here is the notion that technological development 
carries with it certain 11imperatives tt which impose s tructural 
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requirements upon the social environment in which this devel­
opment occurs. To the extent that the advanced societies 
adapt to these requirements, they will increcisingly come to 
resemble one another in important respects. Winner describes 
the nature of such arguments in this way: 
The technologic�l imperative contains a logic that 
accounts for much of the way chR.nge occurs in modern 
society . The logic is not that of syllogistic in­
ference.  Rather, it is the pragmatic rationale of 
necessary action. If you desire X and if you have 
chosen the appropriate means to X, then you must sup­
ply all of the conditions for the means to operate.  
To  put it differently, one must provide not only · the ­
means but also the entire set  of means to the mea.ns.f5 
At any rate , technological change requires  adjustments _ in .. 
almost every d imencion of social life--customs, traditi(?ns , 
ideologies, political and religious institutions--if it is to 
be successful. But the signif.icance of t-his is that ?-ny such 
conception ultimately depends upon a distinction between - so­
cial phenomena which are regarded as "fundamental 11 and those 
which are regarded as merely 0derivative". Technological - ad­
vance is invariably seen as the key variable, primarily be- ·· 
cause it seems to follow a· course independent of the vicissi­
tudes of other. social phenomena . These are by and la.rge his-
toricist assumptions. 
But as we have seen , Bell explicitly denies that eco­
nomic activity inflexibly 0determines" the characteristics of 
other s oci;:-.:.1 e.ctivity. What allows hlm ' to s�'. th,is is a: very 
neat distinction that he makes , between the polity, the cul-
t re [?.nd the 
- -
structure . Bell· claims that the 
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distinguishing features of post-industrial society--the rise 
of a technical-managerial class, the centrality of "theore­
tical" knowledge and meritocracy--are characteristics only 
of the social structure. These characteristics will do no 
more than "pose problems" for the other aspects of society, 
the resolution of which is indeter.mine,te. 
This is nothing but pure obscurantism. First of all, 
Bell frankly admits that within what is referred to as the 
11social structure", technological change is the determining 
factor . More important, however, is the fact that Bell ne­
ver j ustifies on theoretical grounds why the lines between 
the three spheres should be drawn precisely where they are. 
This would seem to be a logical prerequisite for arguing , as 
Bell d oes, that one cannot predict the impa.ct of' changes in 
one social realm upon the activity of another social realm. 
It seems quite app.s,rent that the " c'ulture" and the "polity" 
are merely residual categories into which Bell very conven­
iently lumps all phenomena which are not accounted for by 
technological advance within the social structure . In other 
words , the distinction Bell makes here is essentially arbi­
trary. Bell himself implicitly recognizes this: 
Conceptual prisms are logical orders imposed by the 
analyst on the factual order. But since the factual 
order is so multifarious 2.nd complex, many different 
loeical orders--each with its own axial principle-­
can be imposed on the same time or social �rame, de­
pending on the questions one has in mind . 1  
At any rate , im r:iaking this distinction Bell reaps 2. double 
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b enefit. First , he protects himself from the accusation of 
having posited a unitary social system, and hence from a 
charge of historicism . But he is also able to account for a 
multitud e of social chara,cteristics with respect to technolo­
gical advance. 
Bell's theoretical intentions are very clear. He wants 
to identify the key to overall structural change, and his ef­
fort depends entirely upon acceptance of the idea of a so­
cial system and the crucial variable ., Besides, even if one 
were to accept Bell's distinction between the ree social 
spheres, with respect to the features of post-industrial so­
ciety which have been dea,lt with in t:bis essay, precious lit­
tle rem&dns undetermined since they are already included un­
der nsocial structure" .  Isolating the "culture" is really 
just Bell ' s  way of accounting for the "antinomian" art forms -
and behavior patterns which he sees  a.s acting in osition 
to tt�: ai1�i:'"p�irciple of the so cial structure--technicul ra­
tionality and meritocracy. As for the polity, the thrust of 
Bell's argument indicates that it i§. in fact strongly influ­
enced by the social structure. The most salient character­
istic of the polity in post-industrial society, centre,liza­
tion of authority , is a direct result of the organizational 
complexity and the increa cingly technical nature of d ecision­
making which are associated trith technological advance .. We 
mustn ' t  be misled by Bell ' s  convoluted argum.ent . He too 
shares the assumption2 just cutlined , 2nd a.s such must sub­
scribe t o  s orne version of the convergence thesis. 
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v 
If my argument is correct t then post-industrialism must 
be seen as a doctrine which insists upon the wholesale adap­
tation to the exigencies of te chnologicel change and complex- · 
ity. And if the structural characteristics of post-industri­
al society are said to represent effective adaptations to . 
such change, then there is clearly a sense in whi ch -the --post­
industri::"lists attempt to "legi timize n them. This is par'"'.' _ 
ticul2rly true with respect to the increasing importance of 
s cientific and technical expertise. Bell and company are 
very much interes ted in demonstrating that a successful tran-
. . ;: 
sition to post-industria depends quite heavily upon the r�­
location of political power and authority in the hands of 
technically qualified experts. Some post-industrialists ,. 
such as Donald Micha.el in his book _'.rhe Unprepared Society t 
a.re quite explicit on this point. His argument is very il­
lustrative because it is more overtly polemical than 13ell ' s � ;17 
The Unurepared Society largely consists of a series of e xam­
ples  2bout the management problems posed by a society in­
creasingly characterized by exotic technologies, technical 
decision-making procedures 2nd organizational complexity � 
Michael 's  a.ssesr3ment of all of this is typically post-ind us­
trialist. The advanced societies should not oo llectively 
evaluate the desireability of these changes. No , to do  that 
would only represent an immature, re;..; c tionary luddism. In­
stead , technologic,:;.l advance should be viewed as a challen2:e 
to our ability to P dapt to its require�cnts. And the 
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per,rarii ve uncertainty associated 1;i th technologicsl e. dvance 
most of all requires that scientific 2nd technical knowhow 
become the principal sources of politic!:cl 2utLority� 
At t}:is point we encounter another similarity between 
technocratic and post-industrit'.list theories . The post-in­
dustrialists are pc.tinfully aware. that the political hegemony 
of the expert can only come thro1-tgh the effective neutraliza­
tion of "political" d ecision-making criteria. While they , 
are not prepared to argue that technical rationality contains. 
within it an in.1-J.erent "logic" for the ordering of society, 
the post-industrialist$ nevertheless share with the techno­
crats a profound fear of the consequences of allowing deci­
sions to be based upon action-orienting world-views, faiths 
and ideologies . To the extent that existing political mech­
anisms and procedures are the product of metaphysical legit­
imations (e-.g. , natural law) , they almost surely can never 
react with adequate efficiency to the technological vexations 
of a po.st-industrial society. The anti-democratic implica­
tions of this view are too obvious for the post-industrial­
ists to ignore. With rare insight , Brzezinski remarks that • • • 
••• the rapid pace of change will put a premium on 
anticipating events and planning for them. Power 
will gravitate into the hands of those who control 
the information , and can correlate it most rapidly. 
Our existing post-crisis mane.gement institutions 
will probably be supplanted by �-crisis manage-
ment institutions , the task of which will be to iden­
tify in advance likely social crises and to devel­
op prograrrunes to cope ·with them . This could en­
courage tendencies d uring the :next several deccdes 
tm·mrds a technocratic dictatorship , leaving less 
and 
,1e!3
s rfgm for political proce(ures as we n01-1 
kno� tnem . 
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Now it is cle ar that Brzezinski and the others do not 
in B,ny sense advocate a technocratic ttoverthrow0 of libera.l­
democracy . Quite the contrary : One of the pervasive themes 
in post-industrialist theory, and especially in convergence 
theory , is that one way or another upolitics "  will continue 
to play an important role in the future society (remember 
that from the stancC'point of technocracy, npolitics0 m�ans 
the persistence of any non-technical judgmental criteria) . 
This argument has a couple of variations. For Michael and 
Brzezinski, the continuation of politics manifests itsel� in 
the need for "humanistic" technocrats. Both o:f these theo­
rists express a fea.r that political leadership might just in­
volve something more than being able to do a regression anal­
ysis or enga�- in operations research. :Michael in fact de­
votes an entire chapter of his book to the need for educa­
tional reforms which will at once rid the expert of his nar­
row vision and sprinkle him with a little wisdom besides. 1 ' 
But all of this represents nothing more than slushy nostal­
gia; it just falls flat. If the post-industrialists were 
asked to determine what is in fact more "adaptive "--wisdom 
or expertise--there can be no doubt as to their eventual re­
sponse . Brzezinski's remarks tell the whole story: 
The new society will require enormous tal ents--i;U3 
well ai::. a, measure of nhilosophics l wisdom--to ma­
nage and integrate effectively the expected cha.w­
ges. Otherwise , the dynamic of change could ch�2-otically dictate the patterns of social change . ·  0 
The need for a type of knowledge be;yolld rnere s cientific end 
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t echnic2l knowhow is, it  s eems to me, an implicit recogni­
tion of the fact thst  technocretic legitimations are in some 
way inac equate. But this appears as no more than an after­
thought. 
Perhaps a more important variation is Bell ' s  assertion 
that in a post-industrial �ociety, policy questions "cannot 
be settled on the basis of technical criteria ; necessarily 
they involve value and political choices. ff ;21 Bell is of 
cause echoing Weber here. Scientific and technical knowledge 
can help us determine the consequences of pursuing a speci­
fic end, or the relative efficiency of various means to that 
end, but it can never in and of itself prescr; be ends. :;(; 
Bell is quite a.ware of the fe.ct that technological and econ­
omic complexity have brought about a situation where society 
can no· .lo;tger afford to allow maj or decisions to be made 
through the haphazard workings of the marketplace ; complex 
interconnection s ignificantly amplifies  the repercussions of 
individual action, which mea.ns that the potentially da.nger­
ous consequences of such a.ction will be much wider in scope, 
and hence much le�a� tolerable. Therefore ,  Bell argues ,  d e­
cision-:na.king ·will increasingly become a matter of conscious 
social choice , and it will take plsce largely at the politi­
cal center. From this J3ell c onclude s  that "politics" will 
in fact be !!!.Q£Q important in po::,t-industrial society. 
But what is E-ell re2lly up to here , anyway? He correctly 
recognize s  that s ince not all value conflicts can be d ecided 
e xclus ively on the basis of technical criteria , there will 
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always be a need for theory. H owever, Bell uses this pure-
(t'YIJ"-f : 
ly locigal fact/\to escape the accusation that he is a.n apol-
ogist for " crude technocracy '', realizing full well that the 
general thrust of his 2.rgu..'!lent is the.t increasingly t echni­
cized decision-making processes severely limit the scope of 
political action. After all, the mere fact that questions 
of value will always be involved in 2aking choices does not 
by any mec.1.ns imply that the g�p.erPl publ�p will be able to 
particip2.te in ml:'.,king those choices. What Bell is essentially 
saying is that the hegemony of a.n elite corg� of tech:nici�.:.ns 
a.nd scientists is in fact a :prerequisite for maintaining g_n.z 
role at  all for political theory . Bell's technocratic bias 
is scarcely concealed : 
The shaping of conscious policy, be it in foreign 
p olicy, defense, or economics, calls to the fore 
the men with the skills necessary to outline the 
c onctraints ahead, to wo rk out in detail the man­
a.ge,:ent and p olicy procerl f fr-es, and to assess the 
consequences of choices. 22 
Somehow, even Bell's acknowledgement of the need for theory 
doesn't n,ake much sense in the context of hi£-'. overctll argu­
ment. A political theory usuc.illy involve s  a conception of 
what is to count as legitimate p oJitical authority. But it 
is obvious that the 2.uthority of the scientific r1nd t echnical 
intelli:entsi2 will never be challenged by " theory", regard­
le::-; s of Low lor;icalJ.y necc :, s ::: ry it :c1ay be . The fr1ct of· the 
matter is tha t Dell , l ike the other pos t-ind ustrialists, sees 
the �ranscendence of the old cepitalist  plutocracy by the 
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scientific and technical intelligentsia as a necessary adap­
tation to technological adv,:1nce . 
This is further substantiated by the fact that the post­
industrialists do not even attempt to disguise their support 
of the merit princ�. As we noted in the first chapter, 
"me-ri tocracy•• denotes a social order which is committed to 
the escalation of all citizens into functional roles which 
are c ommensurate with their natural abilities . Meritocracy 
has traditicnally been regard ed as the logical outcome of a 
situation in which true equality of opportunity prevails, and 
consequently has been defended primarily on these grounds . 
The idea is that functional roles, and the differential re-
wards 2nd privileges e�ssociated with them, ought _.!19.1; to be 
distributed on the basis of arbitrary and fortuitous person­
T1,s 
al characteris over which the ind ividual has no control. 
Rather, a social order is regarded as just only when these 
things are based upon characteristics which are in some sense 
"natural". In a pure meritocracy, such as the one d�scribed 
by r,Iich-�el Young in his fa.ntasy, The Rise of the Meri tocre.cy , 
natural characteristics are usually understood to be genetic. 23 





undeserved as anything else, so the notion 
that a meritocracy can be described as u just 11 quickly evapo ... 
rates. Indeed, as John Schaar has pointed out, equality of 
opr:,orttmi ty ( and hence the merit principle) is inherently un­
intelligible as an indeuen&ent principle of justice. 24 �he 
concept of distribut ing functional roles end their a ttenc c:mt 
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p ri viliges on the c:,a ,� is cf merit rn2.k�1s no mense unless ws 
have already defined ahe2d of t ime what abilities are to te 
regard ed as valuable. 
We have Geen that G , ' ientif'ic .:�nd technical expertise 
are highly valued by the nest-industrialists, and their de­
fense:- of meritocracy rests largely upon the fact that it . is 
a useful tool for the identification of individuals who pos­
sess the natural ability to acquire these skills. In  other 
words, meritocracy is itself defended an an indispensable 
mechanism for the effective adaptation to technological ad"."" 
vance and the problems associated with it . One should refer 
once ;:,gain to the passage by Brzezinski cited on page eleven1 
since he is quite candid on this point. It is certainly ob­
vious that there are no " systematic criteria" available for 
the determination of intangible characteristics such as wis­
dom or experience . A commitment to meritocracy, then, neces­
sarily entails a previous commitment to the development of 
skills which rely upon neasureable _ talents. Neritocra.cy is 
the method of politicnl recruitmenf�which is most consistent 
with a political system in which legitimate authority is held 
to be a function of technical expertise. The logic of this 
position actually leads the post-induntriElists t o  occasionait� 
ly conpare the authority which derives from scientific and 
technical expertise with more traditional forms , cle::::.rly 
expordng their technocre.tic bias. Notice Bell ' s  use of the 
word "leaderi:;hip 0 .L in '- the .. ifolloirin5 pass2.se : 
( 
-4 1-
• • •  there is :no reason why the principle of meri­
tocracy ::ohould not obtain in business and govern-, 
rnent as well (as in the university ) .  One wants 
entrepeneurs and innovators Kho c��n expand the 
amount of productive wealth for society. One wants 
men in political office who can .9:overn well. The 
quality of life in any society is determined , in 
considerable measure, by the quality of leader­
ship. A society which does not ha.ve its best men 
at the head if its leading inst�!utions is a so­
ciological and moral absurdity. 
In summary, I have attempted to indicate a sense in 
which post-industrialism can be said to entail a. technocratic 
conception of legitimate political authority. While the 
post-industrialists do not .:--:sr�ue that the hegemony of a sci-
entific 2nd technical elite is "logi required by the --------
scientific method or industrial technique, they do see it 
as a necessary ad:::,.pta.tion to the exigencies of technological / 
I 
change. It is for this reason thot it is legitimate to view / 
the post-industrialists 2.s contemporary spokesmen for n�-1 
tive technocracy. But this is true in even a more funda- /I 
----.._, 




An Analysis and CritiQue 
I 
By now it should be fairly clear that contemporary theo­
ries of post-industri2l society entail what really amounts 
to a, technocratic le6itim2tion of political authority � In  
an  age increasir:5ly characterized by unmanageable organiza­
tional complexity , technological virtuosity, and abstruse de­
cision-making techniques , governing must of necessity become 
primarily the realm of the expert. Any other arrengement 
would lead to nothing but chaos. Acceptance of some "objec­
tivelyu valid doctrine or world-view, or even of a.n ideology 
which merely sanctions the open competition among subjective 
interests , can o.nly undermine our capacity to adapt to the 
requirements of technological change. Our very survival , 
then, d epends upon our recognizing thn.t scientists and tech­
nicians ought to be accorded political c�uthori ty . At any 
rate, thia is whet the post-industrialists woLld have us be-
· lieve. 
In this secti on I will r'ttempt to formulate a critique 
of post-industrial ism based upon an 2 nelysis of the norma­
tive implications cf th� technocratic mod e of political 
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Jl.er;i timaticn .  It must be c.• dwi tted here thr, t even thcugh 
p os t-ind ,_: s tri2 lism can be r�ee:n es a mod ern reprer: entative of 
technocratic thought, a critique of technocracy in a paper 
ostensibly devoted to the orie s  of post-industria is , in a 
sense, contrived . The reader  may very well object t o  my ha­
ving devoted s o  much space to  the post-industrialists given 
the fact that my ultimate object of condemnation is normative 
te chnocracy. 
I am prepared to  offer only two responses to such an ob­
j e ction. :Pirst of all , it is often assumed that technocra­
tic ide ol ogy (make no mistake about the fact that it is an 
ide ology) 6.ied along with H oward Scott ' s  crackpot organiza­
tion , Technocracy , Inc. 1 :Normative technocracy strikes the 
modern reader as being extremely na.ieve and simplis tic . To 
my knowledge no serious political theorist in recent years 
hc�S ever suggested that scientific-technical knowledge con­
tains within it logical "principles" for the ordering of so­
ciety. Even the post-industrie.lists don't go  this far . 
Therefore, my emphasis upon the p ost-industrialis ts is  inten­
ded to  dern onstrc:tte tha.t the implicit assumptions, goals and 
biases of technocratic ide ology are .still very much present. 
Secondly , my critique of technocracy inv-olves not only exam­
ining the bases of technocratic legitimation, but also the 
p oliticr:: l consequences of a s ituation in which such a m od e  of 
legitir:1r, t i on actually pred ominates . It s eems to me that 
the ories of p os t-industria, ins ofar cG they are primarily em­
piricc1,l c:nalyses, r:�re them:=; e lves quite reve aling a2. t o  wh2.t 
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these c onse c; ucnces be. 
II 
The most striking feature of technocr._.:itic theory is its 
incredible SCTugness. As we noted in the preceeding chapter , 
technocratic theorists such as Bacon and Saint-Simon felt no 
need to invoke some metaphysical principle to "legitimate" 
the authority of the scientist-expert. Again, the reason is 
that for these theorists traditional modes of legitimation 
lead to nothing but intellectm:tl, and hence political, chaos. 
The "political0 realm is implicitly understood to be that 
which obscures the otherwise self-e-vident principles of so-:­
cial organization, as embodied either in the scientific me­
thod or the 11logic 11 of industrialism. Technocratic theorists, 
then, envisioned what really amounts to the historical tran­
scendence of politics as such. The new technocratic order 
needs no independent legitimation, because it is the insti­
tutional embodiment of the public good. It  by definition can­
not be justified on moral grounds, because it is precisely 
such concepti.ons ,, hich prevent the new order from being real-
ized. 
Froiil a strictly logicc":i.l point of view, technocratic le­
gi tim2.tions appear to be .wholly untenable. It just doesn't 
seem possible to argue that all world-vi ews, ideologies, re­
ligions and philosophies which mc=,ke cl2.ims with respect to . ul­
timate er:.ds are nothing hut "illu:::ions",  and yet maint2.in 
th2.t t echnicGl re:, tionc�lity c onte ins e lo<ic which oup�ht to 
govern social c:1rr,Jnge::1 ents. This kind of c.rEurnent, ho·wevcr, 
\ 
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m akes much more c.cnse if we take into consid erc, tion the char­
acteristic biases n nd goals of technocrr•tic thought. 
It is abs olutely crucial to remember that technocratic 
theoris ts view tra.di tione.l more.I or metaphysical conceptions 
of ul tim.ate ends a.s having prevented mankind from understand­
ing the truly n essential 11 purposes of 2 .. ny society . c· . .:..:For ex­
ample , a confirmed technoc_rat would regard as obscurantist 
any debate over the relative merits of political e 'luality or 
inequality if it was assumed that either one must be shown 
to have intri nsic value. The "worth" of a.ny particular so­
cial component can only be understood in light of its util­
ity in bringing about a condition of material abundance , or 
in Hobbes ' words , '*commod ious living".Technocratic theorists, 
especially Bacon and Saint-Simon , exibit an astonishingly 
na,.ie)re optimism in assuming that if only it were _possible to 
i. ___ .,/ 
strip away all ot · our uniquely npolitical n conceptions, the 
truly essential function of any social order--provision of 
the good life--would become universally obvious. 
If one stops to think for a moment , an attitude such 
·- - ,, 
;.� .' . .. �_:; 
as this is not really all that aif'ficul t to sympathize with •. 
After all , do we not express similar sentiments when we vent 
our wrath against the "petty politics" -which , for excJnple , 
results in farmers beirY:j paid not to produce , or for that mat­
ter whenever we perceive that basic human needs are being ne­
glected for "political0 reasons? What I 'm trying to get at 
here is that all of us sh2re a perception that material ex-
istence is somehow basic. There is u...Yldeniably a sense in 
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which providing an adequate material existence is l ogically 
uprior 1t to other aspects of social life. But what the tech­
nocr<'i.tic theorists do is to raise · this need almost to the le­
vel of an ethical imperative, although they certainly wouldn't 
describe it as such . This is not to say that technocracy is  
an ideology of crass hedonism, although I will later argue 
that this is the £_ractical basis of any technocra.tic legiti­
mation . The technocratic theorists simply felt that the ma­
terial lot of all men could be substantially improved through 
the systematic application of the scientific method . If _tllis 
were accomplished, the masses would immediately recognize 
the e ssential irrelevance of politics . 
Intima.tely associated with this emphasis upon material 
abundance is a profound yearning for intellectual a,nd oli­
tical order This is of course a frequent desire in Western 
political theory, but it is perhaps even more basic t o  tech­
nocratic theory . To see why this is the case, it is quite 
useful to contrast the technocra.tic outlook with that of 
Hobbes, who was certainly very much interested in establis�­
ing a stable political orcer .  Hobbes , as did the technocrats ,  
recognized that political order is d ependent upon intellectual 
order. The bas i c  problem for the sovereign, then, is to - �r­
rive ::-1t a set of conceptions upon which everyone could agree . 
If we can arrive at static definitions of our conceptions, 
then it will be logically impossible for persons to acquire 
notions which are at odds ·with those upon which the legi tima­
cy of the state ir.:; b£�sed. To this end, Hobbes proposed the 
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adoption of a science of politics . Through use of the prop-
er methods, it would become possible to neutralize the biases 
which prevent agreement upon - definitions of politic-al con;.. · · 
cepts. The Leviathan is essentially a collection of such de� 
finitions. 
Hobbes of course tried to maintain that his definitions 
were objectively correct ,  but he admj_tted that the proof ul­
timately rested with their usefulness to the sovereign in . 
creating an orderly state. In other words , if Hobbes were 
pressed on this point, he would have to admit that his scien­
tific method results simply in an agreement upon one bias, 
the "objectivity" of which depends upon the sovereign enfor­
cing it . In technocratic theory, on the other hand, order 
is  not a political characteristic , �.nd does not come about 
through any agreement upon political conceptions. Indeed, .•. 
recognizing that order as such (or for that matter any other 
moral or political imperative ) is of no intrinsic value:·rs 'in 
fact a prerequisite for the existence of a truly staQle social 
order ! For the technocrats, so cial order is the natural and 
spontaneous outcome of a situation in which "politics0 has 
been transcended. Order is not artificial ; it is not some­
thing which we have to create, as it is for Hobbes . Hobbes 
felt that conflict had to be suppressed. In technocratic 
thought, the need for order is even more basic since it ap­
pears as the truly nc.,tural condition of mankind. Order is 
not fragile, precisely because it is not created by political 
means ., 
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All of this, again, is  largely intended to  show that 
there � certain preferences or biases which are basic to 
technocratic theory. Taken as a whole , they might be said 
to constitute what_ I . will refer . to. as . the technocra.:tic . !!.im­
pulse 0. :But the technocratic theorists certainly did not . 
view  their predilection for material abundance and political · 
order as nothing more than a simple pre judice. From their 
perspective, these are simply the defining characteristics 
of an objectively efficient technocratic order. For theo­
rists such as Saint-Simon, stability and abundance would in­
evitably come about if only society would recognize that sci­
ence and industry entail a " logic0 which ought to govern so­
cial arrangements . It seems to me, however, that the tech­
nocratic theorists were so overawed with the seemingly lim­
itless uotential for material and organizational progress 
latent within these forces, that they assumed that by merely 
stripping away the political restrai.nts upon them, mankind 
would spontaneously recognize the truly natural or e ssential 
mode of s ocial orgainization. More importantly, they assumed 
that because a technocratic society would be judged on the 
basis of its efficiency, and not on political or moral cri­
teria , it did not require a standard moral legitimation. 
TechfiOCr&tic theorists in  effect posit an "end of history" ,  
a period in which ethical categories no longer h&.ve 2ny mean-
ing. 
It is isportant at this point to distinguish between 
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two meanings of the term legitimacy. 2 On the one hand, 
there is the modern socic:.1-scientific conc-e-ption, under which 
legitimacy is seen a.s a. condition of political acquiescence. 
Here, legitimacy is rooted in the public ' s  acceptance of the 
existing political order. Traditionally, however , legitimacy 
has been regarded as describing a condition of moral entitle­
ment. It  is u.."1.derstood thz.t a set of political elites in 
fact has the right to govern . I would argue that normative 
j 
technocracy can be said to entail only the former conception . \ 
I t  may very well be the case that a society, c ollectively or­
ganized for the purpose of m.aterial advc'.nce in accordance 
with the highest standards of technical efficiency, would ex­
hibit considerable politic2l stability . After all, with the 
exception of the ninteen-sixties, post-war America has done 
pretty well for itself . But how, after all, can n1egitimacyn 
in this sense be regarded as anything other than a form of 
-collective briberi'? While t.he public in a technocratic or­
der would undoubtedly be willing to accept the rule of the 
scientists and the engineers, this fact alone is insufficient 
to justify the claim that their hegemony is truly legitimate 
in the traditional normative sense. In technocratic theory, 
then, the people must be bought off. 
This raises some questions about the technocr,:.tic no-
tion that poli tice.l order s omehow naturally and inevitably 
accompanies the d evelopment of a technocratic sod iety. Of 
course, order results from the elimin2.tion of c.onflict, and 
the te chnocrats see this , i2 turn, 2.s arising out of the 
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c ollecti ve ree.lization of man..'J.cin6. ' s  n esE:ential n purpose .  
But the technocrats seem to be v..nea:::dly aware of the fact 
that tr:e public 's  obedience is not re:=.;.lly based 1..1.pon any 
sense -tof reverence or respect for legitimate political au­
thority. They also seem to recognize the underlying fragil­
ity of a. system in which these sentiments are absent. I f  :. .: 
this were not the case, there would seem to be no reason for 
the inclusion of elaborate politico-relic;ious :facades in 
much technocratic theory. It seems clear, for exa..�ple , that 
Saint-Simon ' s  "New Christianity" really amounts to a sJlbz:ti­
tute progr2.m for the purpof�e of cementing the people's loy­
alty to the system (i. e ., for creating legitimacy in the so­
cial-8cientific sense ) . 3 But realize further that since 
such poli tice.l fac2.des c'.re b ·,,.- definition non-essentiGal, then 
the one possible basis the technocrats may have had for 
claiming that their schemes result in morai legitimacy quick­
ly evaporates. To be sure, tech..."1.ocratic theorists attempt 
to dispense with moral categories entirely by positing a har­
mony of fact and value in a. technocratic order. But if the 
underlying assumption of .:;_n essential social activity is 
n ot exactly a nmoral n conception, it must  be admitted that 
it at least . functions as the technocrr!.tS' rationale for 
claiming that scientific elites somehow nought" to govern ,  
end that their authority is legitimate. This rationale is 
l::.;_rgcly underuined by the technocrats ' ad::1ission that some­
thing non-e r sential to the productive process as such is ne­
cess2iry in order to insure public acquiescence. Somehow 
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even the technocrats are aware that the term 1egi timacy :_" 
falls flat when it is used to describe what is n othing more 
than collective social indulgence. 
IV 
So what , then , is my criticism of the technocratic mode 
of legitimation"i Is the problem that scientific knowledge 
is inherently incapable of showing us how social life "ought" 
t o  be arranged, and that as a result the technocrats simply 
fail to offer a traditional moral legitimation of political 
authority? Although J _will try to  demonstrate that this is 
indeed the case ,  my obj ection to  normative technocracy goes 
s omewhat deeper than this . A considerable amount of time 
has been spent here in examining what I take t o  be the im­
plicit value assurnptions of technocratic theory. It is only 
when we recognize these as values that the technocratic 
claim to have disc overed objectively efficient principles 
of social organization makes sense. But what I find s o  dis­
turbing about technocracy is that its ultimate reliance up on 
the authority of science as a principle of legitimation in 
fact leads t o  a situation in which the technocratic ttimpulse" 
will assert itself more readily. 
It seems to  me that technocratic thought cannot really 
be fully understo od if it is only viewed as a political theo­
ry. It is very tempting to  dismiss  n ormative technocracy 
entirely once it has been demonstrated that science l ogically 
c2.nnot exp ose t1 principles"  of  s ocinl organization. However, 
an increasing reliance upon the authority of s cience tends 
l ' 
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t o undermine all nrnetaphysical" doctrines  as such. It is 
not merely that science alone cannot legitimate a specifi- -
cally technocratic order. The increasing prestige and au­
thority of science, because of the necessary separation of 
ufact" and "value 11 which is associated with it, systemati­
cally removes any possible basis for a truly moral legiti­
mation of a social order . " Technocratic consciousness n, ac­
cording to Jurgen Haberm2.s, "reflects n ot the sundering of 
an ethical situation but the repression of 'ethics ' as such 
as a category of life. "4 I will argue that given a world in 
which the reality of tr2nscending objectives is denied , tech­
nocratic values will appear to be the only "rational" one s .  
Befor proceeding with this analysis, however, lets dis­
pense with the technocratic notion that it actually is p os­
sible for science to prescribe values . This is simply in­
consistent with the logicel distinction between fact and 
value. Normative technocracy is wholly dependent upon the 
assumption that there is indeed an "optimal" pattern of s o­
cial organization, and that science can tell us what this 
is. The fact that theorists such as Saint-Simon and Veblen 
disagreed as t o  what is to be regarded as "essential" to  
the system itself suggests that norms of efficiency alone 
cannot function es the basis for a social order. Ends, 
which are either defined by subjective interests or pre­
scribed by a system of values, are lordcally "prior tt t o  
means .  There can be no doubt that scientific knowledge can 
provide 2.n excellent wa,y to deternine the best means t o  
X 
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achieve a given end. But s cient ific knm·rled ge, however con­
ceived, can never tell us wh2t ends are worth achieving. 
Na.x Weber perhaps expresses this view the most consistently : 
• • • the scientific treatment of va.lue-judgments r':!.ay 
not only understand and empathetically analyze the 
desired ends • • ; it can also 'judge' them critical�� 
ly • • • i. e . ,  it can be no more than a formal logical 
judgment of historic2:.lly given value judgments and 
ideas, a testing of the ideas according to the pos­
tulate of the internal cons istency of the desired 
end • • • The elevation of these ultimate standards ,lill, 
to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the 
scientific treatment of value-judgments can do with­
out entering the realm of speculation. As to whe­
ther the person expressing these VElue jud6111ents 
should adhere . to these ultimste standards is his 
personal affair ; it involves will and conscience ,  
not empirical knowledge. 5 
The legitimacy of a technocratic order rests upon the 
assumption that all distinctly "political" influences can 
be eliminated, although it must be admitted that this is not 
so much the ca.se for Bacon as it is for Sa.int-Simon and Ve­
blen. But the logic of the technocratic ·position leads to 
the conclusion that all ends as such c-re political , since it  
is obvious that no p;_�rticular end or purpose is  inherently 
"essentir!l"  to a collection of techn.ological rrie2ns . Veblen 
though that he had succeeded in demonstrating that the in­
dustrial s ociety o:f his d2.y could be effectively "purgedtt 
b:r simply overthrowing the cap tains of i ndustry. · There can 
be no doubt, however , that his d ecisi on to stop at this 
point is essentially quite erhitrary. 
Al though t··: i s  cri ticisw I think ef'fecti vely undermines 
the technocratic claim to have e stablis�ed the basis  for po-
li  ti cal ledi  timacy ir, the :ncrs2 t i  ve �, enr:.e , whet I bave called 
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t he te chrlO(�r�=�tic 0 impulse" d.oes not just disappear as a re­
sult . Technocrecy as a, poli ticc�l theory may not be inter­
nally coherent, but the temot :don to employ scientific me-
thods in order t o  su�ss conflict , establish politi-
cal f;tnbili ty, and in general brinr; about the prerequisi tea 
for " commodious living 11 , is in fact Btronger now than ever 
before. There ere obviously many practical reasons for 
this, sorae of which "'1ere alluded · to in our discussion of 
post-industriDlism. I need o:1ly repeat here the post-indus­
trialists g neral argument that technological advance has 
created a world so cor1plex and interdependent that the po­
tentielly destructive conseciuences of individual action are 
too great to allow tradi ticmal modes of decision-making to 
perpetuete .  But I also want to argue that there is an intel­
lectual and mor,.::.l basis for this tt resurgence" ,  as it were, 
of the technocratic impulse. 
I n  making this argument I should first point out that 
I am heavily indebted to �iax Horkheimer 's analysis in his 
Eclins e  of Reason. Since my argument is largely an extension 
or Horkheimer's, it is convenient at this point to summarize 
his position. If I am not mista..1.cen, reason in general can 
for Horkheimer be described 2�S any form of knowing which en­
ables one to act effectively. However ,  there are two cate­
gories of reas on, the objective and the subjective. Objec­
tive rear; on has to do with ;nap...kinds c2,pacity to understand 
how he ou,;zht to act. It e,ssumes the existence of a princi­
ple inherent in re2.li t;y from 1,hich man c2.n derive a 
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conception of human destination. In other words , objective 
reason denotes the perce?tion of a Truth which renders in­
telli5ible our existence. Subj ective rea son, on the other 
hand, is concerned with evalue.ting the adequacy of various 
means to a given end . Subjective reason does not ask whe­
ther or not ends themselves are reasonable. They are just 
taken as givens. 6 
Originally , according to Horkheimer, these two concep­
tions of reason were able to coexist , but what has happened 
is that over the p ast several centuries the subjective con­
ception has gradually won out over the objective. The possi­
bility of describing an object, concept, or purpose as being 
in itself inherently "reasonable" has been severely under­
mined. Rectson , correctly understood , can now legitimately 
refer only to a certain faculty of the mind which is used 
to coordinate mec:.ns with ends. An object ca.n be said �o 
have "value" only to the extent t:t'.:la.t it is useful in the re­
alization o:f previously · defined ends : 
In the sm.bjectivist view , when 'reason ' is used to 
· connote a thing or t'.'-n idea r:cJther than an act, it 
refers exclusively t o  the relation of such 2.n ob­
ject or concept to a purpose , not to the object or 
concept itself. It means that the thing or idea 
is good :for sometl-1ing else. There is no reasona­
ble aim as such, :::0.nd to discuss the Guperiori ty of 
one aim over e_nother in terms of reason become2 
me2ningless.7 
But if it is held th2.t it i s  no longer possible to 2.rrive 
at a r, et  of absolute principles by which we can judge the 
value of r: omething, 2-,ll philoso:s-,hical categories, including 
"man" himself, become mere phenomena to be classified . 
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Nothing is autonomous, since everything is looked upon exclu-
sively as a means . 
But what e.re the prc:"-ctical consequences of a situation 
in which the possibility of knowing an ultimate Truth is 
categorically rejected? Nha:t happens _ is .that subjectave 
reason, which accepts as truth {i. e. as 11 :facttt ) only scien­
tific knowledge, becomes subject to the vicissitudes of com­
peting interest s. Since reason is now only a faculty for the 
classification of data, there can be no objectively valid 
limits placed upon the ends which it will serve. One value 
is as reaoonable s.s the next, since there is no rationa.l 
agency authorized to appraise and link various ends to an 
objective reality: 
Having given up autonomy, reason has become an in­
stru..�ent .  In  the formalistic aspect of subjective 
reason t stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness 
to  objective c cntent is emphasized; in its instru­
mental aspect, stressed by pragmatism, its surren­
der to heteronomous contents is emphasized . Reason 
has become completely harnessed to the social pro­
cess . Its operational value, its role in the domi­
nation of �en and nature, has been made the sole 
criterion. 
In other words, the subjectivization of reason furthers the 
development of ethical relativism . All ends, whatever their 
content, are simply accepted as raw data, as givens. Since 
no narticular end c::m be  s2-id to bestow· meaning upon our ac­
tions , there is no lor;ical reason why any end can not serve 
as  a legitimete inpetus for action. 
the 
Of cour::.,e , the ul tim:-c.te cP,use of 2.11 of this h2,s been 
. . t .  , t' . t 1.ncreas1:ng preE, ir;e a:no. e.u nori y � t' . .._ . +- .  t' I OI ne sci en 1., l J. l C  N-,'l. nw ., 
-57-
As we have seen, even though the scientific method was ori­
ginally justified on the basis of its ability t o  provide 
" fruits n for commodious living, this fa.ith was itself based 
upon the assumption of an inherent order in natsftute which is 
n ot man made. However, in pre-modern systems of thought in 
which the objective conception of rec. s on pred ominated, real� 
ity in this sense was understood to  be only a part of ua c om­
prehensive system of' heirarchy , or e.ll beings, including man 
and his aims. n9 In  objectivism, ree.lity (i.e., the natural 
world and the relations among humc.n beings and between s ocial 
classes) was identif'ied with Truth and goodness, and it was 
felt th;:::t  an an2lysis of reality could only reveal this 
Truth. However, the original spokesmen f'or the scientific 
method euch as Bacon and Descartes, were quite 1.,mawa.re that 
since science is capable of only a classification and descrip­
tion of the elements of reslity , its acceptance as the only 
le£;itimate form of knowing would inevitably lead t o  a denial 
the.t by understanding re2li ty one can arrive at a Truth which 
somehow m;::1kes reality meciningful. In other words , the rela­
tivistic implications of the feet-value distincti on were 
for a long time unapprecL1ted. 
At any rate , given a situation of t otal value-relc:tivity, 
H orkbeimer p oints out thcd the only norisible "authorityn 
which re:;::ains is science. Eorkhe irier does not mr:ke the mis-
toke of bar; ing t l-.,.is ccnclusion up on the os tcn:::d1)le nvalue-
neutr::0.li ty"  of scientific inq uiry, or up on the assumpt i on 
that r:1 e t�rnd renll v cen ezp o[�,e ::c. re,Ili ty which is ind ependent 
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of the obs erver. S cience is c�n authority because it enhan­
ces our capacity for subjective reason--that is , it is an e x­
tremely useful tool for helping us get what· we wa.nt . It real­
ly makes no difference whether or not there is a.n inherent 
order in the natural . a.nd_so cial world, or whether it is pos­
sible to remove all b .i ases  which interfere with our capa.ci ty 
to understand that order by employing scientifi c  methods . 
It is  enough that a belief in the s e  things enhances one- 's  
power to act in  the world. 
Where, then, does this leave the technocratic mode of 
legitimation·� particu.J.:.arly · '-s · it finds. ex:pression: in theo­
ries  of post-industrial society? First of all, it is clear 
that to the extent that the :post-indur-;trialists maintain , 
that scientific e.nd te chnical elites will acquire power be­
cause of the obj ective requirements of technical rationality, 
this represents nothing more than a pipe-dream. Indeed , 
there is plenty of empirical evidence which suggests that 
scientists and technicians are usually subordinate to vari-
---·- _,- ··= ""'==�, 
ous political interests . 10 Jean Meynaud concludes , tt Tech-
.... ___ ···- _..---,..---------
nocracy has not managed to gain a completely preponderant 
control of government action in any contemporary regime , sup­
posing that this is in fact the true wish of technicians. tt1 1  
In fact , if sp eciolizati on is  as pronounced as is usually 
claimed, its quite d ifficult to imagine a s ituation in which 
the ind ividual expert, whose nvision 11 beyond his own special-
t t � · t  b 1 . .  .,_ , , 1 ·  y mus o:r necessi  y ,e __ 1m1 1,eu, m[--:...::ces  po icy .  It  is even 







cooperro te sufficiently to do this . Yet it has been argued 
that tl-iin type of collegial decision-c:Jaking will become in-
crea.singly prevalent, becaus e  rapid �;ocio-economic change ne­
ce�sitates temporary, ad hoc responses to specific problems. 
This requires that men of widely diverse backgrounds be  re­
peatedly brought together to deal with these problems. 1 2_ · 
But it is precisely because these people are dealing with 
quite specific problems that leads one to believe that the 
generality of their influence is rather limited . 
This is exp ressed very clearly in Anthony Giddens ' no­
tion of "issue-strength" , which refers to the ra.nge of is­
sues over which various types of elite s c�1n exercize authori­
ty. While it is undeniable true that speci.:::.lists impose li­
mitations upon the competence of policy decisions taken by 
the political elite (i. e. , upon the means to achieve _a given 
end ) ,  speciclization itself irnnoses  restrictions upon the 
"issue-strength" of experts , leaving effective power in the 
hands of non-speci2.lists. 1 3 Following Galbraith , we might c c::::i. 
concede that the authority which specit,lists exercize ·within 
their particular fields grants them a large degree of auto­
nomy with respect to the organizational line of a.uthori ty. 
But this is not the same thing as having the capacity to 
shape overall policy. 
All of this cf course suggests the logical validity of 
Horkheimer ' s  c onclusions. When he s ays that reason has be­
come t'harne ssed to the social process tr , this is based in 
part u-;1 cm his recog:ci tion that there is no particu7 ar end 
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which [a:i.b jective reason (i. e. technical means) "must" serve . 
But it is c2.lso ba.sed upon the fact that there are no longer 
any st;c.ndards by which the acceptc1bili ty of' various ends cF: n  
be defi�itively judged . Writers such as Habermas and Alvin 
Gouldner have seized on this fact to attack technocracy (and 
by extension Pqst-indu1:1trialism) as being t1id_eological:.!!. 
The problem with technocracy, according to the s e  theorists, 
is that it sees itself as containing a rationality which 
transcends all subj ective interests, politics, and conflict, 
when in fact it is nothing more than the unreflexive ideolo­
gy of a power-hungry class of technicians who are totally 
subordinate to the powers the.t be. Gouldner remarks that • • • 
• • • the c .ctu2_l structural subordin2,tion of technic2.l 
ratiorn:di ty to ma.nagerial power and economic inter­
ests is occluded by the ideology of the new tech­
nology. The technologists ' wish-fulfilling fanta­
uy of being free from the control of purely politi­
cal, economic, military , or banking interests is a 
tecLnological ideology, a proj ect mistakenly defined 
as an already achieved condition. 1 4 
Gouldner's point is Fell-tc:;ken , but the problem is that he 
tends to assume that the characteristic goals and biases of 
technocratic thou�ht do not exist apart from technocracy es 
a politic8_l ideology . This is simply not the case . 
We he.ve seen that a d-e sire for political order end ma­
terial ,:::bund.ance sre chcrecteristic of technocratic thou5ht. 
Now , t}1 e2e :-' re ty no mc c,ns goc_ls which are in eny way unique 
to techr:ocr;:�cy . Political theorists of every persuasion have 
at one time or anot2:ler concerned themselves with both goals . 

















goals appear in isolation; a reading of Saint-Simon, for ex­
ample, lea.ves one with the impression that nothing else is 
necessary. However, such a conception makes much more sense 
if one views it as a r2sponse to value-�elatiyj sm . Given a 
situation in which ,, ;rords such as 11 oueht" and "value0 are de­
nounced as illusions, it seems to me that there will be a 
tendency to accept these goals as the only legitimate ones.  
I should point out that I am Q.Q.i claiming that this 
is in any sense logically "necess ary". For one thing, it is 
clear that such a tendency is mitigated to the extent that 
traditional philosophies, faiths and world-views persist . 
What I ,rug_ arguing is that in a 1,rorld without abs olilte val.­
ues, people will be more inclined to accept "commodious ll�i­
ving" and political order as legitimate in and of themselves 
for lack of anything demonstrably better. Of course, an ex­
tremely potent tool, the scientific method, is available 
for us to achieve these goals . But as we have seen, there 
are now no: longer any objectively valid restraints which 
can be placed on its use. What are the likely consequences 
of this? 
We noted that the justification for science as an acti­
vity doe s  not have to rest upon the assumption that it allows 
us to discover truths about the natural or social world 
which are independent of the observer . However, as Reinhard 
Bendix points out, »scientists do believe in an ordering of 
s ociety which is not m2..n-made .  This be1:i. ef is a necessary 
precondition of any attempt to arrive at scientific 
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· generaJ.izatic.ns in the study of human affairs. n 1 5  Conse­
quently , science will proceed on this assumption, and the 
past successes of science can only lend support to this ap­
proach. In other words, the scientific method presupposes 
that all factors are relat�n some way , fJnd that in theo­
ry nothing is unexplainable".'./ uExplanationtt , in bothe the 
natural and social sciences, can consist of no more than var-
ious theories which postulate statistically significant in­
terrelationships am.ong various factors , which are then tested. 
Realize that the ongoing assumption of an "order0 here in­
volves only the notion that all factors are in some way con­
nected with other factors; there is no ttmeaning" in any of --t: : :: �::' 
this . 
What is disturbing to me, however, is that total expla­
nation requires total control. The nature of scientific ex­
planation, regardless of whether its account of the world i s  
understood to be objectively true , is inherently technological. 
Method involves the breaking down of the seemingly complex na­
tural and social world into its simpler element.s. This is 
why the ongoing assumption of an orderly universe gives one 
power to act in the world. ' 1'  ·-• If a thing can be broken down 
into its constituent elements, in theory it can be remade , 
perhaps into soE1ething which will help bring about tt .., • c om.In oo. i-. 
ous li ving 11 • This exp1ains Bew on' s faiuous slogan , "lcnowledge 
is power0 • To know h ow something works is to be able to 
� s rn:1ething . Consequently, factors which cc,nnot be ex-





to the b od y  of science, then, requires  instituting that 
state of unity in which all pRrticulars ore truly · related. 
Given a situation in which values themselves 2.re uphenomena" 
which are theoretic2,lly explainable, nothins; can be excluded 
as a subj ect of  control . Ni1ttz;phe was the first to fully 
'-.,_ .. /' 
comprehend and accept the logic of this. 1 6  Nature ( i . e .  
truth) has no value apart from our ability to manipulate i t  
to  insure survival. And survival requires total control, 
total understanding. Science, according to Henry S.  Kariel • • •  
• • • recognizes ( 1 )  tha.t the end for man is quite li­
terally his end��his death, and (2 )  that the end for 
science is the assuring of survival, the maintain­
ing of the social End the individual equ.illibrium.. 
Hence, the purpose of science is to keep everything d 
endlessl v moving . Its credentials are furnished by 
its power tomake society survive; and as so ciety'.:js 
in fa.ct kept forward ;a:nd on the move--wi th out hit­
ches , deviation� , or backtalk-its credentials are 
authenticated. 1 ·1 
Again, I want to emphasize that this in no sense means 
that some kind of amoral technocratic power state is "inevi­
table" ,  or even very likely. After all , scientists have 
their corntnitm.ents , not the least of -which is a cominitm-ent to 
a political system which sustains the activity of science. 
And scientists who publicly accept the implications of value­
relativism for their discipline, such as B . F .  Skinner, are 
often regarded w�: th c ontempt in the scientific community . 
But :the problem s till remains . Any commitment which scie!).c e  
might lw.ve to a certa.in rr nt o f  values is due perh2.ps to a .  
sentimentalism which derives from older traditions. In any 
case, it  is certs.j_nly not a product of the assumptions basic 
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to scientific inquiry. 
V 
To the ·· extent, then, that science assumes increasing 
importance in a society-+there can certainly be no doubt 
about this for our society, as the post-industrialists have 
shown--there will be a tendency for it to strip away any pos­
sible grounds upon which its activity might be limited . But 
total control does not require a rigid, cruel authoritarian­
ism. "Co:nmodious living" is really based upon harmonizing 
the ideal with the real.  "Co:nmodious living" might just as 
well be translated into "happiness" or "satisfaction" ,  c 1rhich 
ia .:.probably '· more in keeping with ·an age in which material 
abundance cannot be provided for all. Man must instead be 
ma.de to Tealize th.rlt a calm , stable r;:;atisfaction corresponds 
with his true interests. Desires must be tampe red with , and 
if it is shown to be biologically necessay, outlets must be 
arr2nged for the expression of anger, hatred, and possibly 
outricht violence ,, The nece :.r ni ty of mo.king agonizing choi­
ces mue:.t 1)e elim5 nated, since this necessity is the cause of 
a.ll social and political inste,bility. 
Of course, the attempt to bring about a.n order such as 
this would in all likel�hood fail miserably.  But the point 
is that thc.� willingness to surrender all of our conceptions 
of a truly meaningful existence for the s.?Jce of the sensation 
of  happiness c2,n only incre��se . T echnocra,cy is an ideology 
' • i • l t'  . . w�ictl e spouses precise_y nis view.  And the fact that it 
nersists in the form o:t' post-L1dustri2,lism is a disturbing 
J. 
fact, ind eed . 
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